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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of a sale of an FM and AM radio 
station in Utah County. The facts of the case are set forth in 
the Amended Brief of Appellants (plaintiffs-purchasers) and the 
Brief of Respondent (defendants-sellers). This Reply Brief will 
address each issue raised by the respondents. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING WITH RESPECT TO 
CERTAIN ITEMS OF MISSING EQUIPMENT WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Exhibit 19 sets forth what equipment was missing. Plain-
tiffs initial brief established that the testimony offered by 
the plaintiffs with respect to many of the items on Exhibit 19 
was not refuted. 
Defendants falsely claim that fl[t]he gravamen of this 
appeal is plaintiffs1 contention that their evidence must be 
believed whenever there is a conflict," and that plaintiffs 
"[argue] that the Court was required to accept [their] version 
of the facts." (Brief of Respondent at 9, 11.) These state-
ments are untrue. Plaintiffs acknowledged that where the trial 
court had made a considered finding based upon conflicting 
evidence, this Court will not overturn those findings. It is 
because of this rule that plaintiffs have not challenged most of 
the findings made by the trial court, even though plaintiffs 
believe that the findings are contrary to the preponderance of 
the evidence. 
This Court should, however, reverse the findings of the 
trial court if they are contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence. In making this determination, it is not enough if the 
findings are supported a mere scintilla of admissable evidence. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Plaintiffs' 
initial brief established that several of the trial court's 
findings do meet this test, in that they are contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence. These findings include the 
findings with respect to the brain, the missing and defective 
equipment identified in appellants' initial brief, and the extra 
payroll expense. Although there may be some isolated shreds of 
evidence which standing alone might appear to support the trial 
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court's findings with respect to these items, the evidence taken 
as a whole is clearly contrary to those findings. 
For example, with respect to the Ampex playback elec-
tronics, valued at $2,000.00, plaintiffs established, by 
citation to clear and straight-forward testimony from both 
plaintiff and defense witnesses, that the equipment was missing 
at the time of the sale. Defendants attempt to challenge this 
testimony by arguing as follows: 
Steven Hope, General Manager of KONI after 
the sale in September, 1982, testified that 
the Ampex equipment was present in the 
station and in working condition. (T. 193-
95). George Culbertson, former owner and 
station engineer, testified that the Ampex 
equipment and the pre-amplifiers were in the 
station when he performed an inventory in 
December, 1983. (T. 277, Exh. 69). Michael 
Pierce, a disk jockey at the station after 
July 1, 1982, used the Ampex playback 
equipment. (T. 3 02). 
Brief of Respondent, pages 12-13. 
Although in isolation these statements might appear to 
support an inference that the Ampex playback electronics 
equipment was in the station, a careful analysis shows that the 
great weight of the evidence was to the contrary. Steven Hope's 
testimony on pages 193-95 of the transcript (R. 617-19), for 
example, shows that the Ampex equipment which he used was a 
reel-to-reel recorder, not the Ampex playback electronics and 
pre-amplifiers. The testimony of George Culbertson set forth on 
page 277 of the transcript refers to the Ampex playback elec-
tronics, but does not unequivocally state that the equipment was 
there. Mr. Culbertson later testified as follows: 
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Q. Going to the next one the tape Preamps 
were not found? 
A. That is true and now those are the 
Preamps that I am talking about with the 
Ampex PR 10 transports. 
Q. Were not in use in any way? 
A. No. 
Q. The stereo heads were they found? 
A. They had been installed in the Ampex PR 
10 and I did not inspect any of them. I 
don't even know if they were still there. 
R. 703-04 (emphasis added). 
The testimony of Michael Pierce on page 3 02 (R. 727) of the 
transcript can only be read as referring to the Ampex reel-to-
reel recorder or another recorder, because the Ampex playback 
electronics were not in use. (R. 702; Ex. 17 (marked with an 
asterisk indicating "not in use11).) 
Similarly, with respect to the noise and distortion meter, 
defendants claim that Mr. Neale testified that the noise and 
distortion meter was in the station, and cite to page 562 (R. 
989) of the transcript. Mr. Nealefs testimony is transcribed as 
follows: "The noise and distortion meter I do know about." 
This appears to be a transcription error because the sentence 
makes sense in the context of the paragraph only if Mr. Neale 
stated "the noise and distortion meter I do not know about." 
Even if the transcription is correct, the sentence does not 
state that the noise and distortion meter was in the station, 
but only that Mr. Neale "knew about it." 
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Plaintiffs1 initial brief showed that one of the two 
oscilloscopes was missing. Defendants countered by stating that 
"Mr. Crawford recalled oscilloscopes in two locations, the 
transmitter room and the transmitter site on the mountain. (T. 
478)" Brief of Respondent at 13. Mr. Crawford's actual 
testimony from page 478 (R. 905), however, is as follows: 
This was a small fairly inexpensive 
oscilloscope. I think there were two of 
those. It was at least one. I remember one 
in the transmitter room and another one up 
on the mountain but I can't remember for 
sure whether it was one or two. 
Mr. Lacy unequivocally testified that the items set forth 
on Exhibit 19 were not present in the station when he purchased 
it. The "evidence" cited by defendants in their brief does not 
contradict Mr. Lacy's testimony. Under these circumstances, the 
Court should hold that the great weight of the evidence is 
contrary to the findings of the trial court. 
POINT II 
NEALE BROADCAST WARRANTED THAT THE 
EQUIPMENT WOULD BE IN "GOOD REPAIR AND 
WORKING ORDER," NOT JUST THAT THE 
EQUIPMENT WOULD BE "USABLE." 
Point II of defendants' brief addresses plaintiffs' claim 
that the brain and two of the carrousels were inoperable, and 
challenges plaintiffs' argument concerning the scope of the 
warranty applicable to those items. Plaintiffs established in 
their initial brief that the Asset Purchase Agreement contained 
two separate warranties: (1) all of the transmitting and studio 
equipment (the first three categories on Schedule 2) were 
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warranted to be in good repair and working order, regardless of 
whether the equipment was in active use, and (2) all other 
assets listed on Schedule 2 (comprising the personal property) 
were warranted to be in good repair and working order if in 
active use. Defendants do not challenge this interpretation of 
the contract, and indeed no other interpretation is possible. 
Defendants1 only response is a claim that the argument is raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
Contrary to Neale Broadcast's assertion, however, this 
construction of the Agreement was, and continues to be, the 
heart of plaintiffs1 complaint against Neale Broadcast. From 
the beginning, plaintiffs have maintained that Neale Broadcast 
breached the warranty provided in paragraph 4.2.3 by failing to 
transfer the assets listed in paragraph 2.1.1 in good repair and 
working order. In their Complaint, for example, plaintiffs 
alleged that Neale Broadcast breached "paragraph 4.2.3 of the 
Asset Purchase Agreement [at] the closing date of said agree-
ment." (Complaint, R. 1-2, paragraph 5.) Moreover, plaintiffs' 
counsel made a distinction between the warranty with respect to 
the personal property as compared with the studio and trans-
mitting equipment in opening argument: 
Paragraph 4.2.3 of the contract states as of the 
closing date all of the personal property listed in 
schedule 2 which is presently in the active use in the 
operation of the stations will be in good repair and 
working order unless otherwise noted on schedule 2. 
The transmitting and studio equipment for the stations 
which are [sic] in good repair and working order. 
R. 442-43 (paragraph structure omitted). 
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This is the very distinction that plaintiffs argue on this 
appeal, and merely because Neale Broadcast has not perceived 
this subtle, yet critical, distinction until now does not mean 
that plaintiffs have just raised the argument for the first 
time. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have presented their 
arguments on appeal in a slightly different fashion than they 
had been presented before the trial court. There is nothing 
improper, however, in so doing. An appeal to this Court should 
not be limited to merely resubmitting the arguments in the same 
fashion in which they were submitted to the trial court. With 
the benefit of hindsight and having had an opportunity to read 
the transcript and to thoroughly consider why the trial court 
was not persuaded by the arguments, a party is expected on 
appeal to restructure its arguments and present them in a more 
persuasive fashion than was done below. 
With the benefit of such hindsight and reflection, it is 
now apparent that both the trial court and defendants failed to 
properly understand the nature of the warranty contained in the 
Asset Purchase Agreement. Defendants argue on appeal, for 
example, that the trial court erred in finding that the warranty 
was breached with respect to the brain and two of the car-
rousels, claiming the brain and carrousels were "in use" at the 
time of the sale. Whether the items were "in use," however, is 
not relevant. The Asset Purchase Agreement required that the 
studio and transmitting equipment be in "good repair and working 
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order". The fact is that the brain and carrousels did not work. 
For the reasons set forth in plaintiffs1 initial brief, 
plaintiffs are entitled to an additional offset for the value of 
the cartel, the Magnecord recorder, and one additional carousel. 
These items were listed on Schedule 2 as being included in the 
purchase, but were not in good repair and working order at the 
time of the transfer.1 
Defendants further claim that the trial court's findings 
with respect to the brain and carrousels were not supported by 
the evidence. Defendants do not challenge the evidence cited in 
plaintiffsf initial brief to the effect that there were numerous 
problems with the brain and carrousels, but only claim that the 
equipment was in some form of "use11 at the time of the transfer. 
For the reasons set forth above, the fact of "use" is irrelevant 
to the issue of whether the equipment was in good repair and 
working order. Plaintiffs' initial brief sets forth substantial 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the brain and 
defendants claim on page 16 of their brief that the cartel 
was in regular daily use up until the time of the transfer. As 
set forth above, the fact of daily use is not equivalent to 
"good repair and working order.u In addition, the portions of 
the records cited by defendants do not refer specifically to the 
cartel, but only to the automation equipment generally. 
Plaintiffs demonstrated in their initial brief that the only 
record references specifically to the cartel established that 
the cartel was not in good repair and working order at the time 
of the transfer. 
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carrousels were not in good repair and working order,2 and that 
finding should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET FOR 
THE COST OF REPLACEMENT OF THE BRAIN. 
Point III of respondents' brief begins by rearguing the 
same issue addressed in Point II, i.e., the brain was used after 
the sale, therefore its condition did not breach the warranty 
set forth in the Asset Purchase Agreement. Plaintiffs have 
refuted that contention in Point II of this Reply Brief. That 
equipment can be coaxed and cajoled into some form of limited 
use does not mean that it is "usable" nor that it is in "good 
repair and working order." In any event, there was ample 
evidence that the brain did not work sufficiently to auto-
matically run the station, which was what it was designed to do. 
The second part of Point III of respondents' brief responds 
to plaintiffs' claim for the full replacement cost of the brain. 
Plaintiffs' initial brief asserted that there was no evidence to 
support the trial court's finding that it would cost $3,000.00 
I 
2For example, Exhibits 12, 13, 14, and 15 detail ongoing 
complaints and comments from employees describing the problems 
they experienced with the brain. Exhibit 15, signed by Malcolm 
Crawford, stated that "the automation has died R.I.P." Exhibit 
70, which is a letter by George Culbertson, a former owner and 
an expert called by the defendants, observed destruction and 
disposition of station equipment and maintenance by good 
technicians who were not experienced, "repairs with 'chewing 
gum, rubber bands and hair pins'", unwise modifications, 
unauthorized experimentation by non-technical people, theft by 
employees and unauthorized removal of station equipment, and 
this was the condition of the station purchased by the plaintiff. 
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to repair the brain, and argued that plaintiffs were entitled to 
an offset for the full replacement cost of the brain because the 
brain was not repairable. 
The trial court found that the Control Design brain was not 
in good repair and working order, and awarded plaintiffs a 
$3,000.00 offset, representing the supposed cost of repair of 
the brain. Plaintiffs1 initial brief challenged that finding, 
claiming there was no evidentiary support for the figure of 
$3,000.00, and also asserting that there was no evidence that 
the brain could be repaired. 
Defendants responded to this argument by asserting that 
Exhibit 68 provided evidentiary foundation for the trial court's 
finding as to repair cost. Brief of Respondent at 22. Exhibit 
68, however, is a letter criticizing certain technical tests 
performed on the radio station, and does not address the 
necessity of nor cost of repair to the brain. It is believed 
that defendants intended to refer to Exhibit 10. Exhibit 10 is 
a proof of performance test which was offered into evidence for 
the purpose of showing that the station did not meet Federal 
Communications Commission regulations. (R. 479-82.) It was not 
offered as evidence of the cost of repair of the brain. 
Defendants, however, apparently reply on the following statement 
contained in Exhibit 10: 
Brain will not work at all. Brain is 
missing cards. Amount of effort needed to 
repair cannot be determined at this time. 
Will probably require $2,000-$3,000 in labor 
by an engineer experienced with the equip-
ment, plus approx. $200-$400 in parts on 
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carrousels and an unknown amount on the 
brain. 
Even if this statement had been offered as evidence of the 
cost of repair, it would not have been admissible. There was no 
foundation showing that the persons who prepared the report had 
any knowledge concerning the cost of repairing similar equip-
ment. More importantly, the quoted statement affirmatively 
states that the cost of repair cannot be determined. It was 
error for the trial court to rely on such avowedly inadmissible 
and speculative statements. 
Plaintiffs1 burden of proof was to establish that the brain 
was not in good repair and working order, and to provide proof 
of at least one of the possible measures of damages. Ault v. 
Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987). If defendants disagreed 
with the measure of damages selected by plaintiffs, the burden 
was on defendants to provide proof of that alternative measure 
of damages. Id. 
In compliance with their burden of proof, plaintiffs 
presented admissible evidence that the brain was not repair-
able,3 and presented evidence that the cost of replacement of 
the brain was $13,104.05. (T. 72, 189.) Defendants contest 
defendants assert that "defendant is unaware of any 
evidence that the control brain was irreparable, only that Mr. 
Culbertson had been unable to repair it.11 (Brief of Respondent 
at page 21.) The distinction is specious. Mr. Culbertson 
testified that he, working together with a trained factory 
representative, had been unable to repair the brain. If the 
factory representative and Mr. Culbertson were unable to repair 
the brain, the only reasonable conclusion is that it was not 
repairable. 
11 
this argument, claiming that cost of replacement is not an 
appropriate measure of damages for damaged or destroyed items of 
property, citing as support the same case cited by plaintiffs in 
their initial brief, Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
Ault involved claims of damage to sentimental personal 
property located in an old home which had been used as a 
residence for delinquent boys. The plaintiffs-owners had been 
awarded damages against the defendant-renter for damages to 
trees, window glass, oak tables, and other similar items. The 
defendant appealed from the judgment, asserting that the 
plaintiffs had only put on evidence of replacement cost, rather 
than lost value. 
In response to the defendant's contentions in Ault, this 
Court noted that "[f]or personal property, such as the destroyed 
oak tables, damages are ordinarily based on market value at the 
time of taking or destruction." 586 P.2d at 1121 (citation 
omitted). This Court further noted, however, that "cost of 
replacement may have been the only evidence available for the 
jury in determining the fair market value of the destroyed 
items." 739 P.2d at 1121-22. Finally, this Court stated in 
footnote as follows: 
Dubois [the defendant-renter], whose 
main attack throughout his discussion of the 
damage question is that loss of value rather 
than repair cost should apply, specifically 
argues that even insofar as repair cost 
might be germane, the Aults actually^focused 
on replacement cost rather than repair cost. 
Our review suggests that much of the 
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replacement cost evidence was indistinguish-
able from evidence of repair cost. For 
example, a shattered window or a broken pipe 
is repaired by being replace. Replacement 
cost was clearly proper as to the dead 
trees, since the only way to effect restora-
tion of dead trees is to plant new ones. 
It is in the context of the damaged 
or destroyed items of personal property 
where evidence of replacement cost seems 
least appropriate, especially since many of 
the items were old, worn, or otherwise 
marginal to begin with, and the date of 
damage or destruction was unknown. . . . 
739 P.2d at 1122 n.7 (emphasis in original). 
Defendants in the instant case cite to the above footnote 
from Ault to support their argument that it would have been 
error for the trial court to award damages for the cost of 
replacing the brain. Defendants apparently claim that the brain 
was "old, worn, or otherwise marginal," and argue that replace-
ment cost was therefore not an appropriate measure of damages. 
Defendants1 argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, 
defendants had warranted that the brain was in good repair and 
working order. The fact that the brain was in a damaged or 
inoperable condition was the very thing which was warranted 
against. Whether the brain was old was therefore irrelevant— 
defendants had guaranteed that it would be in good repair and 
working order. No such warranty existed in Ault. 
Second, the evidence before the trial court established, 
without contradiction, that electronic equipment such as the 
brain did not materially depreciate, and that the current fair 
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market value of a used brain was the same as the replacement 
cost, (T. 69-72.) 
In summary, there is no admissible evidence to support the 
Court's finding that the brain was repairable at the price of 
$3,000.00, or at any other price. The uncontradicted evidence 
before the court established that the brain was not repairable. 
Plaintiffs were entitled to an offset for the fair market value 
of the brain, which in this particular instance is the same as 
the replacement cost of the brain. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE 
EXTRA PAYROLL EXPENSE INCURRED BY REASON 
OF THE INOPERABLE CONDITION OF THE BRAIN. 
In response to plaintiffs1 evidence and argument that they 
were entitled to the $3,355.07 in extra payroll expense incurred 
by reason of the inoperable condition of the brain, defendants 
argue that plaintiffs1 "decision to operate the radio station 
manually rather than by automation was determined by choice, 
rather than by necessity." (Brief of Respondent at page 22.) 
Defendants cite to testimony that the automation equipment was 
actually used, and also to testimony that at least one disk 
jockey preferred to work live. 
Defendants also claim that the evidence would have sup-
ported a finding that the automation equipment worked and was 
used to keep KONI on the air. Brief of Respondent at 23. The 
fact is, however, that such a finding would have squarely 
contradicted the trial court's finding that the brain was not in 
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good repair and working order. The trial court discounted the 
testimony concerning the use of the brain, and found that the 
brain was not in good repair and working order. 
Even if the brain had been "usable" in some sense of the 
word, the testimony established that it still required constant 
supervision. It did not work with that degree of reliability 
necessary for the operation of a radio station with only minimal 
human supervision. It did not work as it was represented that 
it would work. The brain would not control the various pieces 
of equipment and machines it was designed to do. Judge Park 
ruled that the brain did not work, therefore, the plaintiffs 
should be compensated for that value. The equipment not working 
is set forth on Exhibit 20. 
With respect to the contention that at least one disk 
jockey preferred to work live, is irrelevant because he had no 
voice. The equipment would not work. The plaintiffs were under 
an order from Federal Communications Commission to divest 
themselves of one station and not to actively operate two AM 
stations which serve the same broadcast area. 
Where the trial court found that the warranty was 
breached with respect to the brain, it was error to fail to 
allow an offset for all damages flowing from that breach. The 
trial court found that the brain was not in good repair and 
working order, and it follows that the extra payroll expense was 
necessary and not merely a matter of choice on the part of 
plaintiffs. 
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POINT V 
THE AWARD OF COMPOUND INTEREST WAS IMPROPER. 
Plaintiffs tendered the sum of the $89,587.16 into court on 
May 9, 1983. This was tendered in connection with filing of the 
complaint. The plaintiffs were permitted to withdraw the check 
for $89,587.16 and in exchange paid the sum of $59,587.16 on May 
27, 1983, to the defendants and redeposited the sum of 
$30,000.00 with the court. Because that tender exceeded the 
amount then due, no award of interest should have been made. 
The point is that a tender was made on May 9, 1983, or at the 
latest the tender was made on May 27, 1983. This changes by 
thousands of dollars the math that is calculated in a hand-
written document attached to the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law upon which the ultimate judgment was entered. 
The law is set forth in 23 Am.Jur.2d Deposits in Court § 7 
(1983) : "It has been held that a debtor who deposits money in 
court pursuant to law is not, as a general rule, liable for 
interest on the fund during the time that it is in the court's 
custody . . . ." See also Potter v. Gardner, 3 0 U.S. 718 
(1831); Himlev v. Rote, 9 U.S. 313 (1809). 
The Wyoming court in the case of Graves v. Burch, 2 6 Wyo. 
192, 181 P. 354, 360 (1919) held that lf[t]he defendants should 
not be required to pay interest upon the amount originally 
tendered and deposited in court . . . .M 
An examination of the handwritten document attached to the 
judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon which 
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judgment was granted clearly shows that the calculations are 
wrong. Judge Park held that a credit should be given of 
$6,000.00. Monthly payments were to be made at the rate of 
$1,122.36. This would amount to almost five months of payments. 
The handwritten document shows that a credit was given but im-
mediately interest is compounded monthly beginning with July 31, 
1982. If the credit had been properly given as set forth by the 
judge assuming there was a delinquency, arguendo, there would be 
a credit at least until February of 1983.4 The court has 
allowed for interest to be compounded before there is even a 
delinquency therefore the defendants have had the use of the 
money plus now they are claiming it on a monthly basis. The 
defendants were ordered in paragraph 27 of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to recalculate the balance of the 
promissory note after giving credit for $6,000.00 and this was 
not done accurately because this would constitute monthly 
payments for which no credit was given. In the memorandum 
decision of Judge Park, paragraph 27, the court concludes that 
if there was less than $3 0,000.00 due on the promissory note as 
4Plaintiffs received an offset of $6,000.00, plus made 
payments of $2,403.30 and $1,201.65, for a total of $9,604.95. 
Attached to this brief as Appendix MA" is an amortization 
showing that the offset and payments were the equivalent of 
eight regular payments, or through February, 1983. Interest 
should therefore not have been compounded, even under the trial 
court's rationale, until after February, 1983. The attached 
Appendix MBfl shows the amortization with compounding commencing 
after February, 1983. 
The error in the computations is even more pronounced when 
credit is given for the value of the brain and carrousels, as 
shown on the attached Appendix ,fCff. 
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of January 5, 1984 then the plaintiffs shall be given a credit 
for such overpayment together with interest at the rate of 10% 
per annum. By not including interest as a delinquency when a 
credit should have been given, there would be no judgment in 
favor of the defendants. 
The trial court found that the amount owing at the time of 
plaintiffs1 tender in connection with filing their complaint was 
$89,216.93. (R. 323.) Because that tender exceeded the amount 
then due, no award of interest should have been made. 
The defendants rely upon the case of Jensen v. 
Liechtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (Utah 1915). The 
language in the promissory note in the Jensen case is not the 
language in the promissory note that this Court is called upon 
to interpret. The promissory note in the case now before the 
Court states that interest will be paid at 10% per annum. The 
trial court interpreted this to mean compounding interest on a 
monthly basis. This was not provided for in the note. The 
Jensen promissory note provided for quarterly payments. 
Therefore, it is understandable why the Court reached this 
interpretation. For the reasons set forth in plaintiffs1 
initial brief, it was error to compound interest on a monthly 
basis where the note provided for annual simple interest. 
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POINT VI 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES WHERE PLAINTIFFS WERE 
THE PREVAILING PARTIES. 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorneys fees 
because they received the net judgment. This argument ignores 
the fact that the trial court only ordered plaintiffs to pay 
amounts which had been previously deposited with the court. 
These amounts had been tendered into court by personal check at 
the inception of the action, and later replaced with certified 
funds. 
Defendants further argue that they have an absolute right 
to attorneys fees under the terms of the promissory note and the 
individual guaranty. Although defendants did file a counter-
claim and asserted that plaintiffs had breached the terms of the 
promissory note, the bulk of the litigation in this case 
concerned plaintiffs' claim to an offset under the terms of the 
Asset Purchase Agreement. Defendants' attorneys fees were 
predominately incurred in defense of plaintiffs' claims under 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. Under the terms of that Agree-
ment, attorneys fees are allowed only to the prevailing party. 
Under the law stated in plaintiffs' initial brief and under that 
stated in respondents' brief, plaintiffs must be considered the 
prevailing party on the issues relating to the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. The award of attorneys fees to defendants for 
defense of that action should be disallowed. 
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In any event, the fees awarded to defendants were more than 
double the fees awarded to plaintiffs, and were clearly un-
reasonable. 
Defendants further claim that they are entitled to an 
additional award of fees, to include everything after the fees 
were calculated by the trial court. Plaintiffs dispute this 
claim for the reasons set forth above. In the event, however, 
that this Court determines that an award of additional attorneys 
fees is appropriate, those fees should not include any work 
performed prior to the date of the judgment, such as preparation 
of the proposed finds of fact and conclusions of law or the 
written closing arguments. The judgment must be deemed to have 
comprehended all matters occurring prior to the date thereof. 
POINT VII 
ANY JUDGMENT ON REMAND SHOULD BE 
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST STERRETT NEALE PERSONALLY. 
Plaintiffs established in their initial brief that the 
trial court erred in release the funds on deposit to Sterrett 
Neale, personally, without allowing plaintiffs an opportunity to 
respond to defendants1 motion for an amendment of the judgment. 
Defendants respond by arguing that the time for response to the 
motion was governed by Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice, and 
that plaintiffs1 response was untimely when measured by the time 
parameters of that rule. Defendants also argue that the trial 
court's action merely corrected a clerical error. 
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The fallacy with defendants1 argument is that defendants 
did hot proceed under Rule 2.9. Rule 2.9 governs the submission 
of proposed orders and judgments after the court has already 
ruled that the party is entitled to the order or judgment. In 
this case, the trial court had already ruled, but had also 
already entered a judgment. Defendants then sought to amend 
that judgment to change the payee and to add a social security 
number. Whereas Rule 2.9 should have governed the proceedings 
after the court had ruled on defendants1 motion to amend, the 
rule should have had no application prior to the trial court 
ruling on the motion. 
Defendants elected to seek an amendment of the judgment by 
motion. Having elected that procedure, defendants and the court 
should have followed the rules governing responses to motions, 
particularly Rule 2.8. Plaintiffs1 initial brief established, 
and defendants do not dispute, that plaintiffs made a timely 
response in accordance with Rule 2.8. 
The defendants filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 2.8 and then 
proceeded pursuant to Rule 2.9. 
The action of the trial court unfortunately cannot be 
undone. The money has already been disbursed, and probably 
spent. Equity demands, however, that where the money was paid 
to Sterrett Neale, any judgment on remand should be enforceable 
against Mr. Neale to the extent of the funds he received. 
Plaintiffs were awarded judgment against defendants in an 
amount of $8,088.75 but yet the defendants were not required to 
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post any bond. The defendants were allowed to take the money 
out of the court contrary to Rule 2.8. Plaintiffs are now in a 
position where Neale Broadcast Alliance is no longer a viable 
corporation and Sterrett Neale has been dismissed from the case 
but was allowed to take the money personally from the court. 
For these reasons a bond should be posted by the defendants and 
judgment should be rendered against Sterrett Neale personally. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the trial court with respect to certain 
items were contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The 
trial court's findings were further conflicting, in that the 
court found that the brain did not function properly and thus 
breached the warranty in the Asset Purchase Agreement, but 
failed to award the damages, including extra payroll expense, 
flowing from that breach. 
No interest should have been awarded where the plaintiffs 
had tendered the amount due into court, and the interest should 
not have been compounded monthly. The defendants should not be 
awarded interest until the credits and offsets were properly 
accounted for. There is over $9,000.00 that should be accounted 
for before interest would be due. 
The attorneys fees awarded to defendants were unreasonable, 
and should not have been allowed where plaintiffs were the 
prevailing party on the predominate cause of action. 
Finally, any judgment on remand should be enforceable 
against Sterrett Neale personally, where he was the recipient of 
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funds which were improperly released by the trial court. The 
plaintiffs have an unsatisfied judgment of over $8,000.00. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and 
this case remanded for entry of judgment for the cost of 
replacement of the brain and the other items as detailed in 
plaintiffs' initial brief, and for the extra payroll expense, or 
in the alternative, for a new trial. 
DATED this 31st day of May, 1988. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
31st day of May, 1988. 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX "A" 
MOUNTAIN 8TATES BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
VS 
NEALLE BROADCAST ALLIANCE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Court ordered *6,300.00 offset 
ORISINAL AMOUNT OF LOANi *90,9£9.99 
MONTHLY PAYMENTi *1201.63 TERM OF LOAN 12© Month* 
INTEREST RATE 10 % (Compounded Monthly in Default) 
Date 
7 - 198£ 
8 - 1982 
9 - 1982 
10 - 1982 
11 - 1982 
12 - 1982 
1 - 1983 
£ - 1983 
3 - 1983 
4 - 1983 
5 - 1983 
5-9-83 
Interest 
757.75 
754.05 
750.32 
746.56 
742.77 
738.94 
735.09 
731.20 
727.28 
733.34 
197,20 
(8 days interest) 
Principal 
443.90 
447.60 
451.33 
455.09 
458.88 
462.71 
466.56 
470.45 
89587.16 
Balance 
90466.09 
90038.49 
89587.16 
89132.07 
88673.19 
88210.48 
87743.92 
87273.47 
88000.75 
88734.09 
SS931.J29 
( 655.87 > 
ANNUAL INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENT OF NOTE by Mountain Stat< 
Broadcasting Corporation at 10* per annum 
( 721.46 ) 
< 793.61 ) 
( 872.97 ) 
< 942.81 ) 
To 
To 
To 
To 
5-9-84 
5-9-85 
5-9-86 
2-24-87 
65.59 
72.15 
79.36 
69.84 
AF P E N D I X "B" 
I* JADCASTING CORPORATION 
VS 
NEALLE BROADCAST ALLIANCE 
OjY!n£TT7C.TTr>!\{ 5 r u F n ! ' ! 
ORIGINAL AMCL'vT 
MONTHLY PAYI» 
INTEREST RATE 
3AN 120 Months 
IOC'J!" in default) 
Date 
6 
7 
8 - 1 * 
9 - i9ee 
la - i9a2 
13 - 1982 
11 - 1982 
12-1-1982 
12 - 1982 
1 - I J J J 
2 - 1983 
3 - 1983 
4 - 198.3 
5 •• 1 <JM ,1 
5-9-83 
Interest 
787.73 
707.73 
707.75 
707.75 
707.20 
707.20 
707.20 
724.88 
730.92 
198.58 
Pr* -ici pal 
6000.00 
2403.30 
1201.65 
'
 Jay» irf»' "»i' ) 
o9387.16 
Ba i ancEi 
84929.99 
85637.74 
86345.49 
870S3.24 
87760.99 
85357. 69 
86065.44 
84863.79 
85570. 99 
86278^19 
86985. 39 
87710.27 
88441.19 
88637.75 
( 949.41 ) 
ANNUAL INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENT OF NOTE by Mountain States 
Broadcasting Corporation at 10% par annum 
To 5-9-84 
To 5-9-85 
To 5-9-86 
To 2-24-87 
94.94 
104.44 
114.88 
101.85 
I .444. 35 ) 
: 148.79 ) 
563.67 ) 
•v. *.- ) 
APPENDIX " C: " 
MOUNTAIM ', I,. 11 "< i BHGADCPS!ING l.'UHPfJMhi I I LIN 
VS 
NEAL.L.E BROADCAST ALLIANCE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Offaet * 3,030.00 f-ji- Car-ouaeLs 
and Offset * 13,104.126 for Automation Pr'iin 
ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF LOAN« *90,9S9.99 
MONTHLY PAYMENTi *1201.65 TFRM OF LOAN 12fl I'Vih 
INTEREST RATE 10 % (Coi I HI ' In Uolaulti 
Date 
7 - 1982 
8 - 1982 
9 - 1982 
10 - 1982 
11 - 1982 
12 - 1982 
1 - 1983 
2 - 1983 
3 - 1983 
4 - 1983 
S - 1983 
5-9-83 
(8 
Interest 
757.73 
734. 03 
730.32 
746.36 
742.77 
738.94 
733. 09 
731.20 
727.28 
723.33 
191.84 
day» principal 
5-9-83 Remainder of offset 
1 
443.90 
447.60 
451.33 
455.09 
43d.88 
468.71 
466.36 
470.45 
474.37 
478.32 
128.64 
and interest) 
89387.16 
7372.03 
bu J »wt 
90486. 09 
90038.49 
89387.16 
89132.07 
86673.19 
88210. 48 
87743.92 
87273. 47 
86799. 10 
86320. 78 
86192.-14 
( 3395.02 > 
C 10767.05 ) 
ANNUAL INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENT OF NOTE oy Mountain Stati 
Broadcasting Corporation at 10% per annum 
To 5-9-84 
To 5-9-85 
To 3-9-86 
To 2-24-87 
1076.71 
1184.36 
1302.81 
1158.18 
( 11843.76 ) 
( 13028.14 ) 
< 14330.95 ) 
'
 J:3489. 13 ) 
